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Abstract 
The aim of the paper is to outline the topic of the present special issue. In the first section, the 
authors give a concise overview of current discussions on the structure and function of 
linguistic data and evidence in general. They argue that one of the main insights which the 
discussions led to is the need to integrate different data sources in linguistic theorising. The 
second section deals with the specific manifestation of these discussions in cognitive 
linguistics. The authors raise the questions which the papers in the special issue address with 
respect to cognitive linguistics: What data sources can be integrated?; How can different data 
sources be integrated?; How does the integration of different data sources affect the 
acceptability of hypotheses? Finally, in the last section, the structure of the special issue is 
summarised.  
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1. The current debate on linguistic data and evidence 
 
The history of modern linguistics has been inseparably associated with a series of 
methodological discussions on different aspects of the empiricalness of linguistic theories. For 
example, in the seventies of the twentieth century a heated discussion took place around the 
question of whether mainstream linguistic theories – in particular, generative linguistics – 
were empirical. The two philosophical positions confronted were that of Popperian critical 
rationalism and hermeneutics. In the past two decades, the problem was reduced to the 
relationship between corpus data and introspective data. Against the background of this 
distinction, one of the standpoints claimed that introspective data were not empirical and 
therefore not scientific. Generative linguists, on the other hand, regarded corpora on their 
own, without reference to linguistic intuitions and theories, as useless, and argued for the 
indispensability of introspective data. Somewhat later, besides introspective and corpus data, 
interest also turned to experimental data. Nevertheless, during the debate, each of the parties 
argued for their own data source and their own data type based on this source, excluding 
others. Arguments for one of the data sources – such as introspection or corpora or 
experiments in whatever sense – served as arguments for particular theories and against 
others. Thereby, ‘evidence’ was considered a designated data type stemming from a source 
whose reliability was not questioned by the proponents of the approach at issue. Therefore, 
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evidence was assumed to be the firm basis serving the acceptance or the rejection of particular 
hypotheses.  
Currently, the nature of the problem seems to have changed again. The question is no 
longer whether linguistic theories should be empirical or not but rather, what kinds of data are 
permitted and how they function in different linguistic investigations (Penke and Rosenbach, 
2007, p. 1). We highlight two important factors that triggered this change of perspective: one 
is rooted in cognitive linguistics, the other in generative linguistics. 
Cognitive linguistics, as it developed in Germany in the early 1990s (Schwarz 1994, 
1997, 2008), was directed towards interdisciplinary research and the acknowledgement of 
external data (namely, data from empirical and experimental research). It was recognised that 
introspection as the sole method in linguistics could not explain all cognitive phenomena 
concerning language and that some kind of data expansion was indispensable in order to fully 
understand and explain language as a mental system:   
 
“Only through the employment of experimental methods and diagnostic procedures is 
it possible to get an insight into the representation, organisation and processing of 
linguistic units. Introspectively reached data, seen as internal evidence, must be 
complemented by external evidence resulting from empirical and experimental 
research. If linguistic models disregard external evidence delivered by empirical and 
experimental cognition research, there is a real danger that they will ‘theorize away’, 
and in the process lose all contact with cognitive reality. A theoretical approach in the 
framework of cognitive linguistics is empirically adequate on condition that it is 
compatible with psychological and neurophysiological results. All the data realms that 
may provide insight in the architecture and the dynamics of the language faculty 
deserve attention. Consequently, cognitive linguistics offers a broadened 
methodological approach than general, and above all, generative linguistics.” 
(Schwarz 1992, p. 47, 32008, pp. 47-48; translated by the author)   
 
Another important factor was Schütze’s (1996) seminal work that fiercely criticised 
the data processing method of introspection in general and the way generative linguistics used 
introspective data to support its hypotheses in particular. Schütze proposed a considerably 
more refined treatment of linguistic data and the introduction of new data sources into 
generative linguistics such as experiments.  
Following these initiatives, the new millennium has seen a series of works centring on 
the problem of linguistic data in this sense (see for example Borsley (Ed.), 2005, Kepser and 
Reis (Eds.), 2005, Penke and Rosenbach (Eds.), 2007, Schwarz, 32008, Schwarz, (Ed.) 2004, 
Kertész and Rákosi, 2012 etc.). The following quotations illustrate the contemporary 
significance of the problem of linguistic data and evidence:  
 
“When we posted our Call for Papers, we were surprised by the response we received. 
Obviously, we had hit some nerve, and the field was ripe for a discussion of linguistic 
evidence.” (Penke and Rosenbach, 2007, p. vii; emphasis added) 
 
“It seems likely, however, that questions about data will loom somewhat larger in lin-
guistics in the future than they have in the past.” (Borsley, 2005, p. 1475; emphasis 
added) 
 
“Above all it is clear that questions about data are more important than is sometimes 
assumed.” (Borsley, 2005, p. 1479; emphasis added) 
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“In short, linguistic evidence is an extremely important topic as well as a challenging 
problem for linguists of all persuasions.” (Kepser and Reis, 2005, pp. 1-2; emphasis 
added) 
 
“Given the fundamental nature of the problem, linguistic evidence is a remarkably 
new topic of linguistic discussion.” (Kepser and Reis, 2005, p. 2; emphasis added) 
 
As the literature cited above has shown, there is now a tendency pointing towards the 
acceptance of various tenets, which include the following (see Kertész and Rákosi, 2012 for a 
detailed overview of the state of the art):  
 
• There is no single data source that is to be preferred against others at the outset. The 
great diversity of data sources has been acknowledged by metalinguistic research, 
none of which is a priori better or worse than another (Kepser and Reis, 2005, p. 1; 
Borsley, 2005, 1476 ff., Penke and Rosenbach, 2004, p. 514). 
• Thereby, all data sources – among them, introspective, corpus and experimental data 
alike – are considered to be problematic in the sense that their structure, function and 
effectiveness is made subject to explicit metatheoretical reflection.  
• There is a need to combine several data types rooted in different sources in order to 
enhance the acceptability of the hypotheses the data are expected to support. 
• There are no general criteria for defining evidence; rather, evidence has to be rela-
tivised to a couple of factors such as problems, theoretical frameworks and the ‘open-
mindedness’ of linguists (Borsley, 2005, p. 1476, Penke and Rosenbach, 2004, p. 493, 
Kepser and Reis, 2005, p. 3). 
 
 
2. The problem of data and evidence in cognitive linguistics 
 
The papers in the present special issue will focus on particular aspects of the problem of data 
and evidence in cognitive linguistics. With respect to the state of the art outlined above, this 
reduction is motivated by the following considerations.  
 First, in cognitive linguistics a methodological discussion has been emerging which is 
closely related to the general problem of linguistic data/evidence and the trend summarised 
above (see e.g. Kristiansen et al. (Eds.), 2006, Gonzales-Marquez et al. (Eds), 2007). The 
discussion focuses primarily on the relationship between introspective data, corpus data and 
experimental data. On the one hand, the most widely applied classic approaches to cognitive 
linguistics (associated with names like Langacker, Lakoff, Talmy, Fillmore and Fauconnier) 
make primarily use of introspective data. Therefore, just like generative linguistics, the latter 
are exposed to the criticism that their data processing does not rest on an empirically 
acceptable method (see e.g. Geeraerts, 2006, etc.). They are contrasted with the perspective 
which bases cognitive linguistic research on corpus linguistic (Stefanowitch and Gries, 2006a, 
b) or experimental data (see e.g. Gentner and Bowdle, 2008, Gentner and Wolff, 1997 etc.). 
On the other hand, instead of contrasting introspection with corpus linguistic or experimental 
data processing, a series of approaches try to combine introspection with these data sources. 
Just to mention one example, a significant part of cognitive metaphor research focuses on the 
experimental control of introspectively obtained hypotheses which maintain that there are 
metaphorical concepts underlying metaphorical expressions (see e.g. Gibbs, 2006, Gibbs et 
al., 2004 etc.). These approaches are motivated by the background assumption that the more 
data sources support a particular hypothesis, the more acceptable this hypothesis is.  
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 Second, the data problem in cognitive linguistics has not only been raised in analogy 
to the general problem, but from specific points of view as well. For example, the 
applicability of neurolinguistic methods (Dodge and Lakoff, 2005) or specific data processing 
techniques such as Steen’s (2007) ‘metaphorical propositional analysis’ have been considered.  
 Third, raising the data problem has also been related to the fierce criticism of classic 
approaches to cognitive linguistics (Rakova, 2002, Haser, 2005, Geeraerts, 2006) and through 
this, it affects the foundational issues of theory construction in cognitive linguistics. 
Fourth, during the past decade, attempts have also been made to integrate cognitive 
linguistic research with data processing methods stemming from quite different traditions 
such as, for example, conversation analysis (Deppermann, 2007, Liebert et al. (Eds.), 1997) or 
grammaticalisation research (Bybee, 2007).  
 Against this background, the present special issue focuses on one of the basic aspects 
of current discussions on data in cognitive linguistics, namely the convergence of data 
sources. The contributions consider the following questions:  
 
• What data sources can be integrated? 
• How can different data sources be integrated? 
• How does the integration of different data sources affect the acceptability of 
hypotheses? 
 
 
3. The structure of the special issue 
 
The contributions consider the above questions from different points of view. They both 
tackle the foundational issues of cognitive linguistics related to them and illustrate the 
possible answers suggested by examples and case studies taken from the practice of cognitive 
linguistics research. 
The first paper by Monika Schwarz-Friesel entitled On the status of external evidence 
in the theories of cognitive linguistics: compatibility problems or signs of stagnation in the 
field? or: Why do some linguists behave like Fodor’s input systems? gives a general overview 
of the state of the art, criticises current positions and suggests a fruitful new perspective. Her 
starting point is that in recent publications on linguistic data and evidence the ways in which 
linguists use data have been ignored, however fundamental this aspect is. She maintains that 
many linguists insist on the methods and ideas they traditionally use and are not aware of the 
need for a radical change in linguistic work. The author discusses three antagonistic 
approaches to cognitive linguistics. Two of them have in common that they do not reflect on 
their basic assumptions and lack methodological and theoretical openness. Therefore, the 
current debate about data is a symptom of a fundamental crisis in cognitive linguistics. 
Moreover, in the practice of research, questions about data are inseparable from questions 
about the people who handle these data. Although this partly sociological, partly scientific 
problem is of great relevance for the progress of linguistic inquiry, it has been neglected so 
far.  
Klaas Willems’s article Intuition, introspection and observation in linguistic inquiry 
explores the relationship between observation of naturally occurring utterances and intuition 
in linguistic inquiry. In the first part of the paper, the author starts his line of argumentation 
with the insight that the reason why cognitive linguistics in general and Cognitive Grammar 
in particular have not succeeded in developing a usage-based model is that two problematic 
assumptions underpin the cognitive paradigm: the way meaning is defined with special 
respect to the encyclopaedic conception of linguistic semantics; and the failure to distinguish 
between intuition and introspection as methods of inquiry. The second part of the paper 
 5 
discusses a case study on the cognitive account of the meaning of the accusative and dative 
case with two-way prepositions in German. The case study serves to exemplify how questions 
concerning the empiricalness of linguistic inquiry emerge, what the role of introspective 
judgments is and what status linguistic intuition has. The author also shows that quantitative 
data are not sufficient for obtaining a fully coherent analysis of case meanings. Rather, to 
establish the intersubjective, language-specific meaning potentials of cases on the basis of 
intuition – as distinguished from introspection – is important as well. 
In her paper The fabulous engine: Strengths and flaws of psycholinguistic experiments, 
Csilla Rákosi analyses the nature and limits of psycholinguistic experiments which are related 
to problems raised in cognitive linguistics. According to a widely held view among linguists, 
experiments can be regarded as completely reliable data sources that make it possible to turn 
linguistics into a mature empirical discipline meeting the standards of the natural sciences. 
However, the author argues that this requirement is rooted in obsolete and unworkable tenets 
of the standard view of the analytical philosophy of science. In order to provide a viable 
methodology for psycholinguistic experiments motivated by problems discussed in cognitive 
linguistics, she suggests a strategy consisting of three components. First, metascientific 
reflection on the nature of experiments as data sources in linguistics has to consider the 
research activities of linguists conducting experiments. Second, insights gained by 
philosophers of science studying experiments in the natural sciences have to serve as possible 
points of departure for analogies between the structure and function of experiments carried 
out in physics, chemistry, biology, etc. on the on hand, and in linguistics on the other hand. 
Third, the methodological guidelines have to be compatible with a general account of 
linguistic theorising. The workability of this strategy is tested with the help of a case study on 
psycholinguistic experiments in metaphor research. 
In their contribution Circularity effects in corpus studies – why annotations sometimes 
go round in circles Manfred Consten and Annegret Loll investigate the status of annotated 
corpus data in empirical linguistics. Their central claim is that annotators should be regarded 
as co-producers of data. Accordingly, annotations depend on certain theoretical categories and 
are therefore theory-laden. As regards the minimal requirements which annotated data are 
expected to meet, first they have to allow the reconstruction of the original raw data, and 
second, annotations must follow guidelines in order to avoid that the annotator’s decisions are 
arbitrary. The paper exemplifies the problems which result from the close relation between 
annotation categories and their theoretical prerequisites by two quantitative corpus studies on 
anaphora as a discourse-functional phenomenon. One is a newspaper corpus study, the other a 
study on a second-language acquisition corpus. The studies yield the finding that it is two 
circles that are responsible for the problems which the authors discuss. The first circle stems 
from the interplay of deductive and inductive procedures. This interplay causes an impact of 
theory on annotation. The second circle is rooted in the relations between language structures 
and their discourse functions. The latter are not observable independently of the structural 
features of the utterance. 
Within cognitive metaphor research, there are rival approaches which fiercely criticise 
each other’s hypotheses and methods. Despite their conflicts, cognitive theories of metaphor 
have a lot in common. This follows from the circumstance that they belong to cognitive 
science and share its basic assumptions and goals. The paper by András Kertész, Csilla 
Rákosi and Péter Csatár – entitled Data, problems, heuristics and results in cognitive 
metaphor research – deals with the problem of how this complicated relationship can be 
accounted for. The first part of the paper presents a metascientific approach based on B. von 
Eckardt’s notion of ‘research framework’. Within this framework, the second part of the paper 
compares Lakoff and Johnson’s, Glucksberg’s, and Gentner’s cognitive theories of metaphor, 
and analyses their influence on each other. The authors show that due to the criticism and 
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interaction among the three rival approaches, they continuously revise their research 
problems, data processing methods, theoretical model and heuristics. 
Rita Brdar-Szabó and Mario Brdar devote their paper to The problem of data in the 
cognitive linguistic research on metonymy: a cross-linguistic perspective. The paper has two 
goals. Its general goal is to tackle a series of questions which have been raised by cross-
linguistic (contrastive) data and which call for a revision of some widely accepted views. Its 
special methodological goal is to demonstrate the cyclic interaction of the introspection-
driven research and the authentic-data driven research. The authors exemplify this interaction 
by two case studies. The first centres on the referential metonymy of the CAPITAL-FOR-
GOVERNMENT type, while the second examines the illocutionary metonymy that motivates 
constructions that realise the instructional speech act in cooking recipes. Analysing the 
common features of the two case studies and extending them to a number of languages, the 
authors conclude that it is structural factors that motivate the contrastive facts. Raising the 
question of what the functional-cognitive background of the structural facts is, reveals a 
deeper sort of motivation. 
Arnulf Deppermann’s essay asks the question: How does 'cognition' matter to the 
analysis of talk-in-interaction? Both conversation analysis (CA) and discursive psychology 
(DP) maintain that cognitive issues are respecified as discursive phenomena. However, they 
do this differently. The author exemplifies the approach of discursive psychologists who 
investigate discursive practices of talking about mental phenomena and use mental predicates 
by a case study on the use of constructions with German verstehen ('to understand') in 
conversation. The approach of some conversation analysts who examine the way participants 
display mental states in talk-in-interaction is illustrated by a case study on how grammatical 
constructions are used to display different types of inferences drawn from a partner's prior 
turn. On the one hand, the author argues for the constructivist and anti-essentialist stance of 
the two approaches from a methodological point of view. On the other hand, he also shows 
that there is no avoiding tacit assumptions about cognitive processes in the practice of CA and 
DP. He concludes that research on talk-in-interaction would be well advised to integrate 
explicitly a cognitive perspective.  
Finally, in his paper entitled Pragmatic evidence, context, and story design: An essay 
on recent developments in experimental pragmatics Jörg Meibauer raises the question of what 
pragmatic evidence is. Thereby he focuses on cognitive pragmatics which in his view deals 
with the acquisition, production and interpretation of utterances. He compares two prominent 
accounts of cognitive pragmatics, namely, Levinson’s Presumptive Meanings approach and 
Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory. In discussing the way the two approaches handle 
Grice’s notions of Generalised Conversational Implicature and Particularised Conversational 
Implicature, he argues that stories play an important role both in traditional philosophical 
approaches to pragmatics and in experimental pragmatics. Thus, pragmatic evidence is to be 
conceived of as a story that reflects the pragmatic intuitions of a speaker or hearer related to a 
given context. The author concludes that experimental pragmatics would profit from the 
systematic handling of stories representing contexts. 
 Since the special issue narrows down the general problem of linguistic data and 
evidence to the questions (a)-(c) with respect to cognitive linguistics, it tackles basic 
methodological problems of linguistic research in general and of cognitive linguistics in 
particular. It addresses cognitive scientists, cognitive linguists, philosophers of science and 
theoretical linguists alike. Above all, the special issue is meant to contribute to the 
clarification of a foundational problem of linguistic research which will stay in the foreground 
of interest in the coming years.  
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